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83 
State Standing to Constrain the President 
F. Andrew Hessick* and William P. Marshall** 
Ambition, as it turns out, has not been able to counteract 
ambition.1 Or at least this has been true when the ambition that 
was supposed to be countered was that of the President of the 
United States and the institution doing the countering was the 
United States Congress. Presidential ambitions now consistently 
overwhelm those of the Congress with the result that the power 
of the presidency has now become far greater than the framers 
may have imagined—both in absolute and in relative terms.2 As 
far back as 1952, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
Justice Jackson observed that the president “exerts a leverage 
upon those who are supposed to check and balance his 
power which often cancels their effectiveness.”3 Subsequent 
developments have only served to increase the president’s 
leverage since that time.  
Perhaps because it has recognized this reality, the Supreme 
Court in recent years has become notably less sympathetic to the 
notion that it should defer to the vagaries of the political 
wrangling between Congress and the Executive.4 Consequently, 
the Court has become more active in reviewing separation of 
powers disputes.5 This does not mean the Court always rules 
 
 * Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. 
 ** Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. We’d like to thank 
Tom Campbell for his helpful suggestions. Thanks also to Josh Roquemore for his 
research assistance. 
 1 Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 2 See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 
1816–18 (1996). 
 3 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653–54 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring). 
 4 See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196–97 (2012) (rejecting 
the argument that recognition of foreign sovereigns is a political question not subject to 
judicial review) [hereinafter Zivotofsky I]; see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000) 
(per curiam) (resolving dispute about presidential electors instead of leaving the matter to 
Congress as prescribed by Article II). 
 5 See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2096 (2015) (holding 
that the legislature cannot infringe on the president’s sole power to recognize other 
sovereigns and nations) [hereinafter Zivotofsky II]; see also NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. 
Ct. 2550, 2556–57 (2014) (ruling that the president exceeded his authority by appointing 
a member to the National Labor Relations Board under the Recess Appointments Clause). 
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against the Executive.6 In fact, many of the Court’s recent cases 
have upheld the exercise of federal executive power against 
separation of powers challenges.7 It does mean, however, that the 
Court has rejected the premise that political processes alone can 
protect against separation of powers encroachments. The Court, 
in short, has sent the message that it is ready to actively police 
structural constitutional issues.8 
Against this background, it may not be surprising that there 
is a new sheriff in town aiming to challenge the exercise of 
federal executive power in the federal courts. Or, rather, there 
are new sheriffs. In recent years, state attorneys general have 
become increasingly more aggressive in seeking to patrol federal 
executive action. During the Obama Administration, for example, 
some state attorneys general instituted a series of cases, brought 
on behalf of their home states, challenging federal action in the 
areas of immigration9 and environmental protection.10 Since 
President Trump took office, other state attorneys general have 
filed actions against specific directives of his administration, 
most notably in the immigration area.11 All signs suggest that 
 
 6 See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488, 2495–96 (2015) (ruling in favor of the 
Internal Revenue Service’s (“IRS”) interpretation of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), 
which would allow a tax credit for those enrolled in either a Federal Exchange or State 
Exchange, despite the ACA’s seemingly clear language limiting the tax credit for those 
enrolled in State Exchanges). 
 7 See Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2096 (holding that the president has the sole power 
to recognize other sovereigns); see also Dep't of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 
1225, 1233 (2015) (remanding a nondelegation challenge to Amtrak rulemaking). 
 8 See Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2096; Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2577; see also 
Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1523 (2013) 
(criticizing the Court’s willingness to resolve structural constitutional disputes); Rachel E. 
Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the 
Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 336 (2002) (arguing the Court is 
more willing to rule on structural matters). 
 9 See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015) (twenty-
three Republican state attorneys general, three Republican governors whose attorneys 
general were Democrat, and one Republican governor filed suit against the United States 
to challenge the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent 
Residents (“DAPA”) initiative). But see Brief of the Amicus States of Wash., Cal., Conn., 
Del., Haw., Ill., Iowa, Md., Mass., N.M., N.Y., Or., R.I., and Vt., and D.C., in Support of 
Motion to Stay District Court Preliminary Injunction at 1–2, Texas v. United States, 809 
F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-40238), 2015 WL 1285125, at *2–3 (fourteen Democratic 
attorneys general for fourteen states and the District of Columbia filed briefs in support of 
the United States’ amnesty policy). 
 10 See Brief for Petitioners at 1–2, West Virginia v. EPA (D.C. Cir. Nov. 26, 2014) 
(No. 14-1146) , 2014 WL 6687575, at *6 (twelve Republican attorneys general filed briefs 
against the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) in response to increased regulation 
of coal power plants). But see Final Brief for State Intervenors in Support of Respondent 
at 10, West Virginia v. EPA (D.C. Cir. Mar. 4, 2015) (No. 14-1146), 2015 WL 926748, at 
*6–7 (eleven Democratic attorneys general and the District of Columbia filed in support of 
the EPA’s increased regulation measures). 
 11 All briefs filed by state attorneys general—both in opposition and in support of the 
travel ban executive order—were done so strictly along party lines. See, e.g., Motion for 
Leave to File and Brief for N.Y. et al. as Amici Curiae in Opposition to Petitioners’ Stay 
Do Not Delete 3/21/18 4:27 PM 
2018] State Standing to Constrain the President 85 
this trend of state attorneys general challenging exercises of 
presidential power will continue.12 
These state attorneys’ general suits face a critical threshold 
barrier: standing to challenge federal executive power. Do the 
states have such standing and, if so, under what circumstances 
may they do so? This issue was central in Texas v. United States, 
a case in which the Fifth Circuit found that Texas had 
standing.13 The question was ultimately left unresolved by the 
United States Supreme Court when the Fifth Circuit decision 
was affirmed by an equally divided Court.14 
This essay examines the issue of state standing to constrain 
presidential power. Part I reviews why presidential power has so 
drastically expanded since the Founding. It further discusses 
why Congress has not been up to the task of checking the 
president and why expanded state standing might be a useful 
vehicle to constrain executive power. Part II canvasses the 
existing case law regarding state standing to challenge federal 
executive action and specifically includes recent cases brought 
against the Obama and Trump Administrations. Part III 
demonstrates how courts have found states to have standing to 
challenge federal executive action, but also discusses how the 
scope of that right is not yet clear. Part III(A) discusses why 
states might be appropriate parties to bring actions challenging 
federal executive power, including their role in diffusing power 
 
Application at 3, Trump v. Hawai’i, 138 S. Ct. 42 (2017) (No. 16-1540), 2017 WL 3049332, 
at *5 (New York, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and 
D.C. filed as amicus curiae in support of Hawaii’s action); see also Profiles in Courage, 
DEMOCRATIC ATTORNEYS GENERAL ASSOCIATION, http://democraticags.org/profiles-2/ 
[http://perma.cc/MUC2-65YC] (last visited Aug. 1, 2017) (showing every state attorney 
general in the aforementioned brief who opposed both the current administration’s travel 
ban and climate change deregulation are Democrat); Motion for Leave to File and Brief 
for Tex. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners and their Stay Application at 1, 
Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project (2017) (No. 16-1436), 2017 WL 2533119, at *4 
(Texas, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and West Virginia, 
and the Governor of the State of Mississippi filed as amicus curiae in defense of the 
administration’s executive order); see also Meet the Attorneys General, REPUBLICAN 
ATTORNEYS GENERAL ASSOCIATION, http://www.republicanags.com/meet_the_ags 
[http://perma.cc/69TD-XXFN] (last visited Aug. 1, 2017) (showing every state attorney 
general in the aforementioned brief who supported the travel ban executive order 
are Republican). 
 12 See Juliet Eilperin, NYU Law Launches New Center to Help State AGs Fight 
Environmental Rollbacks, WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/politics/nyu-law-launches-new-center-to-help-state-ags-fight-environmental-rollbacks/ 
2017/08/16/e4df8494-82ac-11e7-902a-2a9f2d808496_story.html?utm_term=.a7c7b3e8b7b9 
&yoyolxmi [http://perma.cc/UY2P-MQAT] (reporting that Bloomberg Philanthropies 
funded a center to help state attorneys general bring environmental actions against the 
United States). 
 13 Texas, 809 F.3d at 155–56. 
 14 Texas v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016). 
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within the federal system. Part III(B) offers some reservations, 
such as the fact that the states’ motivations in maintaining these 
suits may be based more on partisan interests than on structural 
concerns with constraining the federal executive. Part IV 
proposes that states should enjoy a modicum of liberalized 
standing by allowing a more generous construction of injury-in-
fact as applied to them than would be applied to other entities. It 
suggests, however, that even this modest grant of standing 
should be subject to further prudential review in light of the 
potential problems that state standing engenders. Part V offers a 
brief conclusion. 
I. THE EXPANDING POWER OF THE PRESIDENCY 
As numerous participants in the Symposium have noted, 
presidential power has expanded exponentially since the 
Founding.15 There are many reasons for this expansion.16 Some 
are simply the unavoidable effects of forces inherent in modern 
government dynamics. For example, as Justice Jackson observed 
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the fact that the 
office of the president has a unique hold on public and media 
attention means that in “drama, magnitude and finality” its 
decisions far overshadow those of any other.17 In addition, the 
need for modern government to respond quickly to national crises 
necessarily invests power in the presidency because only that 
institution has the ability to act expeditiously.18 The growth of 
the administrative state19 and the power of the armed forces has 
inevitably empowered the president, who stands at the head of 
 
 15 See Randy Beck, Promoting Executive Accountability Through Qui Tam 
Legislation, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 41–42 (2018) (discussing a shift and rebalancing of power 
from the legislative to the executive branch); Gary Lawson, Representative/Senator 
Trump?, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 115–19 (2018) (demonstrating how executive branch’s power 
has expanded through subdelegation of legislative authority); Sanford Levinson & 
Mark A. Graber, The Constitutional Powers of Anti-Publian Presidents: Constitutional 
Interpretation in a Broken Constitutional Order, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 168 (2018) (noting 
the large power of the “[c]ontemporary” president); see also Tom Campbell, Executive 
Action and Nonaction, 95 N.C. L. REV. 553, 555–56 (2017) (noting expansions of 
executive power). 
 16 See William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably 
Expands and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505, 507–19 (2008); see also Flaherty, supra 
note 2, at 1816–19; Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential 
Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 125 (1994) (“Now, it is the President [instead of 
Congress] whose power has expanded and who therefore needs to be checked.”). 
 17 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring). 
 18 See Flaherty, supra note 2, at 1806. 
 19 See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers 
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 587 (1984) (describing the degree to 
which administrative agencies are centrally managed by the president). 
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both the Executive Branch and the military.20 The president has 
unique access to and control over information in a world where 
information is power.21 
Other factors have contributed to this expansion. Presidents, 
for example, are able to build upon the collective actions of their 
predecessors in justifying their own actions—creating a one-way 
ratchet that consistently expands presidential power from 
administration to administration.22 The legal limits on 
presidential power are defined in the first instance by the 
president’s own appointees in the Justice Department23 who, 
even if committed to providing objective legal advice, are often 
predisposed to finding ways in which the president can further 
his agenda.24 Finally, presidents are interested in building 
legacies and they well understand that history judges leaders by 
their actions and not by their forbearance. They are therefore 
constantly exploring new avenues and methods to get things 
done.25 After all, the last president celebrated for not exercising 
power may very well be George Washington and his decision not 
to run for a third term.26 
Another key reason why presidential power has so 
drastically expanded rests not with the presidency but with 
 
 20 See also Norman C. Bay, Executive Power and the War on Terror, 83 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 335, 338 (2005) (discussing presidential control of the military). 
 21 See Patricia M. Wald & Jonathan R. Siegel, The D.C. Circuit and the Struggle for 
Control of Presidential Information, 90 GEO. L.J. 737, 737 (2002).  
 22 See Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the 
First Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451, 1458–60 (1997); see also John Yoo, 
Jefferson and Executive Power, 88 B.U. L. REV. 421, 429–30 (2008).  
 23 See LUTHER A. HUSTON, ARTHUR S. MILLER, SAMUEL KRISLOV & ROBERT D. DIXON, 
JR., ROLES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 51 (1968). 
 24 See GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: FDR AND THE INTERNMENT OF 
JAPANESE AMERICANS 103, 107 (2001) for a discussion about how the ability (and 
motivation) of the attorney general to challenge a president is likely to be particularly 
diminished in times of crisis. The most famous documented example of this involves 
Attorney General Francis Biddle and the evacuation of Japanese Americans during World 
War II. Although Biddle had considerable doubts as to the constitutionality of the 
evacuation order, he ended up dropping his opposition in the face of military objections 
and a president who had, nonetheless, decided to go through with the action. See id. 
 25 President Bush, for example, was particularly aggressive in claiming that he had 
inherent powers that justified his taking unilateral actions on key matters. See Bush Says 
He Signed NSA Wiretap Order, CNN (Dec. 17, 2005, 8:07 PM), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2005/POLITICS/12/17/bush.nsa [http://perma.cc/9Y44-LF7H]. President Obama, in turn, 
relied on his expansive reading of statutes to support his unilateral decisions. See Charlie 
Savage, Shift on Executive Power Lets Obama Bypass Rivals, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/23/us/politics/shift-on-executive-powers-let-obama-
bypass-congress.html?mcubz=3. 
 26 See Rufus King, Personal Memorandum (May 3, 1797), in 3 THE LIFE AND 
CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS KING: COMPROMISING HIS LETTERS, PRIVATE AND OFFICIAL, 
HIS PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, AND HIS SPEECHES 545, 545 (Charles R. King ed., 1896). 
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Congress.27 An effective system of separation of powers requires 
Congress to protect its institutional prerogatives to check the 
Executive. Yet the relationship between Congress and the 
president has become instead, in the words of Darryl Levinson 
and Richard Pildes, separation of parties.28 Members of Congress 
see their primary role as advancing the interests of their party 
and not protecting Congress’s institutional prerogatives.29 
This dynamic has reduced the power of Congress and 
increased the power of the president. When the same party holds 
Congress and the presidency, congressional majorities often 
stand behind their president even when doing so might diminish 
their own institution’s authority, a practice that directly serves to 
expand presidential power. Less obviously, even when there has 
been a divided government, the dynamic of hyper-partisanship 
has indirectly led to increased presidential power. In times of 
divided government, of course, Congress is motivated to attempt 
to check the president because it is in its partisan interests to 
do.30 Yet presidents have become adept at characterizing this 
resistance as Congress not doing its job to justify exercising 
executive power unilaterally. They have thus been able to turn 
congressional efforts to block their agenda into a mechanism for 
enhancing their own powers.31 Congress, meanwhile, has had no 
effective response. 
In contrast to Congress, one institution that has been able to 
block the president thus far is the Supreme Court. In cases such 
as Youngstown,32 United States v. Nixon,33 and the war-on-terror 
decisions,34 the Court has imposed important limits on the 
Executive. Equally important, even in cases in which the 
 
 27 See Michael J. Teter, Gridlock, Legislative Supremacy, and the Problem of 
Arbitrary Inaction, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2217, 2222 (2013). 
 28 Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2329–30 (2006). 
 29 See Jeff Flake, My Party is in Denial About Donald Trump, POLITICO MAG. (July 
31, 2017), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/07/31/my-party-is-in-denial-about-
donald-trump-215442 [http://perma.cc/UX7H-RPBY] (condemning both parties for blindly 
engaging in partisan behavior). 
 30 See Franita Tolson, The Union as a Safeguard Against Faction: Congressional 
Gridlock as State Empowerment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2267, 2267–68 (2013) 
(describing an instance where Republican senators blocked a veteran jobs bill to prevent 
President Obama from signing beneficial legislation before the 2012 election). 
 31 See William P. Marshall, Warning: Self-Help and the Presidency, 124 Yale Online 
L.J. F. 95 (2014); William P. Marshall, Actually We Should Wait: Evaluating the Obama 
Administration’s Commitment to Unilateral Executive-Branch Action, 2014 UTAH L. REV 
773, 786 (2014). 
 32 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952). 
 33 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974).  
 34 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536–37 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 
557, 646 (2006); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 794 (2008).  
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president has prevailed, the Court has indicated it is fully willing 
to subject exercises of presidential power to judicial review.  
Courts can hear cases only when parties have requisite 
standing. This means that presidential actions may be able to 
escape judicial review because of standing limitations. For 
example, if the lower courts had not granted standing to Texas to 
challenge President Obama’s Dreamers initiative, which declared 
a policy of not enforcing immigration laws against a large class of 
immigrants, then it is likely no party would have been able to 
maintain that suit.35 To establish standing to challenge a policy, 
an individual must show he suffered an injury in fact because of 
that policy.36 The Dreamers policy of not enforcing the law does 
not obviously injure anyone; instead, it confers a benefit on the 
immigrants covered by it. Giving the states standing to sue, 
therefore, may be the only way through which a president’s 
actions can be subject to judicial scrutiny. The next sections 
accordingly examine the current law governing state standing 
and discuss whether the scope of state standing should be 
adjusted so as to provide an additional check on the expansion of 
presidential power. 
II. STATE STANDING TO SUE THE EXECUTIVE UNDER CURRENT 
LAW 
A. The Law of State Standing 
State suits against the president and other federal executive 
officials seeking to force compliance with the Constitution and 
federal law invariably raise questions of Article III standing.37 
Standing is one of the various doctrines that implement the 
“cases” and “controversies” provision in Article III.38  
Ordinarily, to have standing, a person must demonstrate 
that he has suffered, or is imminently about to suffer, an 
“injury in fact.”39 That injury must be to a “legally protected 
 
 35 Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s 
Nonenforcement Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. 
L. REV. 781, 786 (2013). 
 36 See WRIGHT, ET AL., infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 37 Although the most heavily litigated, standing is not the only obstacle states face in 
suits against federal actors. For example, states must also demonstrate their claim is ripe 
and not moot. Although the United States and its officials also enjoy sovereign immunity 
in suits by states, Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 
280 (1983), section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act waives that immunity for 
suits seeking non-monetary damages against an “officer or employee” of the United 
States. 5 U.S.C. § 702. Accordingly, so long as a suit does not seek damages, sovereign 
immunity should not be an obstacle to state suits against federal officials. 
 38 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 39 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009). 
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interest”—for example, the interest against unwanted physical 
harm—and it must be “concrete and particularized.”40 The injury 
must also be “fairly traceable” to the actions of the defendant, 
and it must be susceptible to “redress[] by a favorable decision.”41 
Individuals who fail to satisfy these requirements cannot 
maintain suit in federal court.42 
But for states, things are different. States can establish 
standing by demonstrating an injury to the same sort of interests 
held by private individuals such as the interest in holding 
property. But because they are sovereigns, states also have 
sovereign and quasi-sovereign interests, and the violation of 
those interests can also support standing.43 Thus, states have 
broader potential standing than private individuals.44  
A state’s sovereign interests include its interests in enforcing 
its criminal and civil laws. States can sue to enforce these 
sovereign interests even when they do not suffer an injury in 
fact.45 A state has standing, for example, to prosecute Dan for 
assaulting Vicky in violation of state law, even though the 
assault does not hurt the state.46 For similar reasons, states have 
sovereign standing to defend their laws against challenges that 
the laws are unconstitutional or preempted,47 and they have 
standing to challenge federal laws pressuring the states to 
change their laws.48 
A state’s quasi-sovereign interests are less well defined.49 
They include the state’s interest “in the well-being of its 
populace,”50 such as by protecting its residents from pollution,51 
reducing unemployment in the state,52 preserving wildlife in the 
state,53 and ensuring that the state is “not . . . discriminatorily 
 
 40 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016).  
 41 Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61(1992). 
 42 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102–03 (1998). 
 43 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982). 
 44 Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 689, 695 (2004).  
 45 See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 136 (1986) (finding state standing based on the 
“interest in the continued enforceability of its own statutes”). 
 46 See Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 392 
(1995) (finding there is no standing problem when a state “prosecutes criminal and civil 
actions under its own laws in its own courts”).  
 47 See Taylor, 477 U.S. at 137. 
 48 See West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d 861, 868 (finding state standing to challenge 
federal regulation requiring states to adopt new standards or to accept federal standards). 
 49 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 13A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE  
§ 3531.11 (2d ed. 1984) (describing quasi-sovereign interests as “admittedly vague”). 
 50 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 602 (1982). 
 51 Id. at 604–05. 
 52 Id. at 608 (finding parens patriae standing to reduce unemployment). 
 53 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923) (noting “the quasi sovereign 
right of the State to regulate the taking of wild game within its borders”). 
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denied its rightful status within the federal system.”54 States 
have parens patriae standing—so-called because a state 
asserting these interests is seeking to protect its residents and 
resources—to vindicate these quasi-sovereign interests. 
B. State Suits against the Federal Executive 
States’ standing in suits against the federal government, 
however, is more complex. Although states have standing to 
vindicate sovereign interests and parens patriae standing to 
vindicate quasi-sovereign interests in other contexts, neither 
form of standing provides a sound basis under current doctrine to 
sue federal officials to force compliance with a federal statute or 
the Constitution. States do not have a sovereign interest in 
federal compliance with a federal statute or the Constitution.55 
Federal law and the Constitution are not state law. Although 
states must enforce federal and constitutional law, it is because 
those laws trump state laws. The violation of federal law 
accordingly does not inflict injury on a state’s sovereignty. It is 
only if that violation also happens to violate, or interfere with, 
state law that a state suffers a sovereign injury supporting 
sovereign standing.56 
States also likely do not have parens patriae standing to sue 
the president to force him to comply with federal law or 
the Constitution. This is not because states do not have a 
quasi-sovereign interest in ensuring that their residents are 
governed by a law abiding federal government. They do. The 
failure of the federal government to obey federal law can 
threaten a state’s property, resources, stability, and population. 
Rather, the problem is that, according to the Supreme Court, 
states cannot assert those interests of its citizens against the 
United States.57 
The reason is that the point of a parens patriae suit is to 
allow a sovereign to protect its citizens, and the citizens of a state 
are also citizens of the United States.58 According to the Court, 
the United States has the primary responsibility of managing the 
federal government and ensuring its compliance with federal 
 
 54 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc., 458 U.S. at 607. 
 55 Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 
851, 886–87 (2016). 
 56 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323–25 (1966) (upholding state’s 
standing to enforce state law against Attorney General).  
 57 Michigan v. EPA, 581 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[A] State may not use 
[parens patriae] to sue the United States.”). 
 58 Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485–86 (1923). 
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law.59 Therefore, states cannot sue the federal government as 
parens patriae to protect state citizens from unconstitutional acts 
of the federal government.60 For example, in Massachusetts v. 
Mellon, the Court held that Massachusetts lacked parens patriae 
standing to challenge, under the Tenth Amendment, a federal 
law giving money to states that took certain measures to protect 
mothers and infants.61 
Under this logic, states likely do not have parens patriae 
standing to sue the president or other federal officers to force 
compliance with the Constitution or federal law. Such a suit 
seeks to protect state citizens from federal actions that violate 
federal law or the Constitution. To be sure, the suit targets 
executive actions instead of legislative ones, as in Mellon, but it 
is unclear why that distinction should matter. What matters is 
whether the suit challenges the acts of the federal government. 
One might argue the difference is that the suit is against an 
officer and not the United States. That difference, however, 
should not matter as to a state’s parens patriae standing. The 
United States acts through its officers to protect its citizens as 
parens patriae. That is especially true for the president. Article II 
explicitly tasks him with seeing that federal law is enforced.62 
Given the difficulties with states establishing sovereign or 
quasi-sovereign standing against the president, it is no surprise 
that courts that have recently found that state standing to 
challenge presidential actions have avoided the sovereignty and 
quasi-sovereignty question, and have instead based standing on 
factual injuries alleged by the states.63 Consider Texas v. United 
States.64 There, the Department of Homeland Security adopted a 
policy of not enforcing immigration laws against a large swath of 
 
 59 Id. (“[I]n respect of their relations with the [f]ederal [g]overnment[, it is] . . . the 
United States, and not the state, which represents them as parens patriae, when such 
representation becomes appropriate; and to the former, and not to the latter, they must 
look for such protective measures as flow from that status.”). 
 60 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324 (“Nor does a State have standing as the parent of its 
citizens to invoke these constitutional provisions against the Federal Government.”); 
accord Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 18 (1927); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 49, at 
§ 3531.11.1 (“[I]t is settled that a state cannot appear as parens patriae to assert 
the rights of its citizens to be protected against unconstitutional acts of the 
federal government.”). 
 61 Mellon, 262 U.S. at 486. 
 62  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 63 See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 155–56 (5th Cir. 2015) (basing 
standing on increased costs from issuing licenses), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. 
Ct. 2271 (2016); Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1158–61 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying 
Lujan factors in analyzing state standing based on alleged harm to proprietary interests).  
 64 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d at 155–56 (basing standing on increased costs 
from issuing licenses). 
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individuals illegally in the United States,65 deeming these 
individuals to be “lawfully present in the United States.”66 Texas 
and twenty-six other states challenged the policy, claiming that 
the Department’s policy violated the Administrative Procedure 
Act. Texas argued it had parens patriae standing and that it had 
suffered an injury in fact.  
In finding Texas had standing, both the district court and 
the Fifth Circuit avoided the question whether Texas had parens 
patriae standing. Instead, they concluded that Texas had 
suffered an adequate injury in fact. The courts pointed out that, 
because Texas law authorizes lawfully present individuals to 
obtain a Texas drivers license, Homeland Security’s policy 
expanded the number of individuals eligible for Texas licenses, 
and Texas would incur costs in issuing these licenses. According 
to the courts, these costs supported Texas’s standing, even 
though Texas could have eliminated those costs by amending 
Texas law to bar those immigrants from obtaining licenses.67  
The Ninth Circuit took a similar approach in Washington v. 
Trump.68 There, Washington and Minnesota filed suit 
challenging President Trump’s Executive Order suspending 
entry of immigrants from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, 
Syria, and Yemen. The states argued the policy violated the 
Establishment Clause, Due Process under the Fifth Amendment, 
the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Foreign Affairs Reform 
and Restructuring Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 
the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Tenth Amendment.69 
Washington and Minnesota asserted standing based on both a 
violation of their quasi-sovereign interests and an injury in fact 
to their proprietary interests. 
Like the Fifth Circuit in Texas v. United States, the Ninth 
Circuit avoided the question whether the states had standing 
based on their quasi-sovereign interests.70 Instead, the Circuit 
 
 65 Id. at 147 (“In November 2014, by what is termed the ‘DAPA Memo,’ DHS 
expanded DACA by making millions more persons eligible for the program and extending 
‘[t]he period for which DACA and the accompanying employment authorization is 
granted . . . to three-year increments, rather than the current two-year increments.”) 
(citing Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Leon 
Rodriguez, Dir. USCIS, et al. 3–4 (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/ 
files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf [http://perma.cc/U2NJ-2J26]). 
 66 Id. at 148 (emphasis omitted).  
 67 See id. at 155–56 (holding the “financial loss[es]” that Texas would bear, due to 
having to grant drivers licenses, constituted a concrete and immediate injury for 
standing purposes). 
 68 See Trump, 847 F.3d at 1157–61. 
 69 Id. at 1157. 
 70 See id. at 1161 n.5; see also id. at 1157 (concluding the States had Article III 
standing based on both proprietary and quasi-sovereign interests).  
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concluded the states had suffered an injury in fact. The court 
stated the executive order caused a concrete and particularized 
injury to the states’ public universities by preventing nationals of 
the designated countries from entering the country to join the 
universities as faculty and students.71  
III. THE SPECIAL ROLE OF STATES IN SUING THE FEDERAL 
EXECUTIVE 
A. The Role of the States 
States have a special role in ensuring the federal executive’s 
compliance with the Constitution because of their interest in 
preserving federalism. Federalism defines the boundary between 
the states and the federal government.72 The federal government 
is one of limited powers.73 For example, the Constitution 
empowers Congress to legislate in only a few designated areas.74 
States do not face comparable limitations. States have general 
government powers. They may broadly regulate in any area, 
including areas in which the federal government may also 
regulate,75 and they may broadly enforce those laws. 
States have an interest in protecting their domain from 
federal intrusion. That interest is most obvious when the federal 
executive takes actions that directly interfere with matters 
committed to the states.76 An example is the promulgation of 
a rule by an executive agency that regulates completely 
local matters.77 
But the states’ federalism interest in ensuring that the 
Executive complies with the constitution is not limited to the 
executive actions that directly invade the province of the states. 
States have a federalism interest in preventing all unlawful 
executive actions, even if those actions do not directly touch on 
an area reserved to the states.78 That is so for two reasons. 
First, states have a political interest in ensuring that the 
president not exercise powers allocated to Congress because of 
 
 71 Id. at 1161. 
 72 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999).  
 73 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000). 
 74 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  
 75 But see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (the prohibition on states “coin[ing] [m]oney” is an 
example of how the Constitution imposes several discrete limits on state power). 
 76 See Grove, supra note 55, at 887. 
 77 See id.  
 78 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of 
Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 359, 462 (2012) (observing that “cooperative federalism 
schemes provide a check on federal executive power” and that “[t]he very growth of 
the federal administrative state has swept states up as necessary administrators of 
federal law”). 
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their better representation in Congress.79 Although the president 
is elected through a nationwide election, he does not represent a 
particular state; he represents the nation collectively. By 
contrast, each state has representatives in Congress who 
can defend their state’s interests. Pushing actions from the 
Executive to Congress thus gives states a larger say in federal 
policy decisions.80 
Second, states have a direct regulatory interest in preventing 
unlawful executive action because a declaration that a federal 
executive action is unlawful prevents that action from 
preempting state law or from otherwise affecting how states 
conduct themselves. Consider an executive order that regulates 
interstate commerce. That order does not impermissibly touch an 
area left to the states because the Constitution authorizes the 
federal government to regulate interstate commerce.81 Instead, 
the constitutional objection is that the order violates separation 
of powers because the Constitution commits to Congress, not the 
president, the power to regulate that commerce. But states have 
a federalism interest in challenging that executive order, because 
that executive order would preempt inconsistent state laws on 
commerce. Voiding the executive order removes the possibility for 
preemption and accordingly leaves the states in a better position 
to issue regulations on commerce. 
The same argument applies to executive actions that fail to 
comply with the Administrative Procedure Act and other 
requirements imposed by statute. Those actions can preempt 
state law. Even when they do not preempt, those agency actions 
can influence the way states act—by, for example, administering 
spending programs that condition the disbursement of funds on 
the state’s meeting requirements imposed by the agency.82 
Because they interfere with state autonomy, states have a 
 
 79  See Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public Law Litigation in an Age 
of Polarization, at 19 (manuscript on file with authors) (“[I]t’s terribly important for 
federalism that Congress make the laws, not executive actors.”). 
 80  See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the 
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 
543, 547 (1954). To be sure, especially in recent times, Congress has not been particularly 
effective at policymaking because of gridlock. But that gridlock may be a function, at least 
in part, of the divergent views of states. 
 81 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 82 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, When is Two a Crowd? The Impact of Federal Action 
on State Environmental Regulation, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 82 (2007) 
(acknowledging, in the context of environment agency action, that “federal agency actions 
can . . . have preclusive effect” and that “[t]he most straightforward way to encourage 
state activity is to offer financial support for state programs that meet federal 
requirements or to otherwise confer benefits on compliant state governments”). 
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federalism interest in challenging executive actions that violate 
the APA or other statutory procedures.83 
This state interest in limiting the federal government to 
protect the states’ prerogatives is a critical part of the 
constitutional design. The principal reason for dividing power 
between state and federal government is to check abuses of 
federal power and to prevent the establishment of a federal 
tyranny.84 The idea is not simply that sharing power with the 
states results in the federal government not having the complete 
authority necessary to establish a tyranny. It is also that state 
officials seeking to protect their own power “stand ready to check 
the usurpations”85 of the federal government. As Madison put it 
in Federalist No. 51, the competition for power between the state 
and federal government ensures that the “different governments 
will control each other[.]”86 The Constitution’s design thus 
contemplates that the states stand as guardians against federal 
overreach.87 All of these interests support enabling states to 
bring suits challenging unlawful executive actions. 
In addition to having these federalism interests, states are 
particularly well suited to bring challenge to executive actions 
because of their democratic accountability. One reason for the 
standing doctrine is to prevent would-be litigants from 
undermining the political process by limiting their access to the 
courts. The premise of our Constitution is that the elected 
branches make policy, and elections are the appropriate 
mechanism to seek to change government policies. Permitting 
individuals to resort to the court to challenge government policies 
short-circuits this political process. Standing seeks to avoid 
this problem by permitting individuals to go to court only if 
they have suffered direct injuries from the government’s 
 
 83 This logic extends to federal executive actions that violate individual 
constitutional rights. A successful challenge to a federal action on the ground that it 
violates a constitutional right promotes federalism by barring federal action that 
preempts state law. To be sure, preventing the federal government from taking actions 
that violate rights would not let states take the same actions, because with only a few 
exceptions constitutional rights equally bar the federal government and the states. Still, 
removing the federal program would leave space for a state to regulate in that area. 
 84 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“Perhaps the principal benefit of the 
federalist system is a check on abuses of government power.”). 
 85 THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 86 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 87  A broad argument for state standing could be based on the premise that the 
Constitution should be viewed as a compact among the states. See John C. Calhoun, 
Rough Draft of What Is Called the South Carolina Exposition, in UNION AND LIBERTY: 
THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 350 (Ross M. Lence ed., 1992) 
(advocating the state-compact theory of the Constitution). If so, states could arguably 
have standing to challenge all ultra vires federal actions as a breach of contract. Because 
the premise of this argument is so contestable and its potential implications so 
far-reaching, however, we do not advance that argument here. 
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actions. Individuals cannot, in other words, base standing on 
generalized grievances. 
Broad state standing does not threaten the political 
processes to the same degree because states themselves are 
political entities. They are unlikely to bring suits that are 
inconsistent with the majority views of their constituency. 
Consistent with this view, states do not face the same standing 
restriction for generalized grievances. For example, unlike 
individuals, states can bring suit to enforce state criminal laws, 
even when the violation of the criminal law does not directly 
harm the state.88 
There are also pragmatic reasons why states should enjoy 
broader standing than individuals. Unlike many individuals who 
might bring suit against the federal executive, states are prone to 
take a more deliberative and cautious approach to assessing 
when to bring suit. They are more likely to evaluate the merits 
more carefully to avoid spending their taxpayers’ money on a suit 
that they cannot win. Moreover, unlike many individuals, states 
have the resources to launch and maintain a significant judicial 
challenge to executive actions.89 As with any major litigation, 
pursuing a challenge to an executive action can be an expensive 
affair because of the scope of discovery, the breadth of the issues, 
and the intense motions practice. In addition, more than other 
types of suits, challenges to an executive action turn on 
sophisticated legal arguments that can be made most effectively 
by attorneys that specialize in the relevant field of law. Most 
private individuals lack the resources to maintain this type of 
litigation and to retain specialist attorneys who are more likely 
to prevail on a such a challenge. 
To be sure, states are not the only ones with the interests 
and resources to challenge the federal executive. Congress also 
plays a significant role in constraining the federal executive. Just 
as with federalism, the reason that the Constitution divides 
power between Congress and the president is to prevent either 
branch from accumulating or abusing its power.90 Conferring 
broader legislative standing on Congress to challenge federal 
executive actions would increase Congress’s ability to play 
that role.91 
 
 88 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 46, at 392.  
 89 See Raymond H. Brecia, On Objects and Sovereigns: The Emerging Frontiers of 
State Standing, 96 OR. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
 90 See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (“[T]he separation and independence of the 
coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of 
excessive power in any one branch[.]”). 
 91 See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 15, at 603, 605 (arguing Congress should have 
broader standing to challenge executive decisions not to enforce the law).  
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Whether Congress should have greater standing to challenge 
the president is beyond the scope of this Article; but there are 
sound reasons to be cautious before proceeding too far down this 
route. The most significant is that broader congressional 
standing could threaten the balance of powers.92 Although 
Congress has largely abdicated its function of checking the 
president, Congress has the potential to be extremely powerful, 
not only because it holds the legislative and other powers, but 
also because it has more direct popular support than the other 
branches of government.93 For this reason, the Constitution 
imposes various limits on Congress’s power. One limitation is 
that the Constitution specifically enumerates Congress’s power. 
Another limitation is that the Constitution prescribes procedures 
that Congress must follow to exercise those powers. For example, 
for Congress to create a law, the bill must pass both houses of 
Congress and be presented to the president for his approval 
before becoming a law.94 Similarly, Article I prescribes a specific 
procedure that Congress must follow to remove a federal officer 
through impeachment.95  
Among the various powers given to Congress are a handful of 
tools with which Congress can respond to illegal executive action. 
The Constitution authorizes Congress to enact new legislation, 
bring impeachment proceedings, withhold appropriations, or 
refuse to confirm nominations. Conferring standing on Congress 
to challenge executive actions would add a new weapon to 
Congress’s arsenal for challenging executive action. If Congress 
one day decided to begin using all of its tools for checking 
 
 92 The text of the Constitution does not explicitly answer whether Congress can 
bring lawsuits. On one hand, the Constitution specifically enumerates Congress’s powers, 
such as the power to enact legislation, impeach federal officials, and approve treaties and 
nominations for various federal offices. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 8, 10. One might argue 
that the enumeration of these powers implies that Congress cannot exercise powers not 
specifically enumerated, and bringing suit is not one of the powers enumerated in the 
Constitution. On the other hand, one might argue that the Necessary and Proper Clause 
authorizes Congress to enact legislation conferring standing on itself to challenge 
unlawful federal action. But cf. Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) 
Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 571, 574 (2014) (“Congress may 
not delegate to itself the power to execute the laws.”) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 
956 (1983)); see also id. at 577 (finding that “[t]he defense of federal statutes by 
[Congress]” offends the principle that “the Constitution carefully separates the enactment 
of federal law from its implementation, sharply constraining Congress’s role in and 
control over the latter”).  
 93 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 309–10 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) (“The legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and 
drawing all power into its impetuous vortex. . . . [The legislature’s] constitutional powers 
being at once more extensive, and less susceptible of precise limits, it can, with the 
greater facility, mask, under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments 
which it makes on the co-ordinate departments.”). 
 94 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.  
 95 Id. § 3, cl. 6–7.  
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executive power, the additional tool of broad standing could 
disrupt the balance of power.96 
B. Concerns with State Standing  
Although there are obvious benefits in granting states 
standing to bring suits to challenge separation of powers, there 
are some serious concerns. To begin with, even if states are well 
situated as an abstract matter to challenge exercises of federal 
executive power, states, in the abstract, do not file lawsuits. A 
state officer or entity (usually the state attorney general) must 
bring such claims in the name of the states. And therein lies the 
rub. Any ideal of the states acting as platonic guardians standing 
against federal executive excesses needs to be tempered by 
political reality. 
There are often raw political reasons why state attorneys 
general pursue actions against the federal government beyond 
their having serious concerns about the scope of federal executive 
power.97 Challenging a president of the other party leads to its 
own series of rewards.98 State attorneys general can earn favor 
with their constituencies, position themselves for running for 
higher office, and enhance their leadership standing within their 
political party.99 They can raise money for their offices and their 
states in the form of damages and attorneys’ fees, and they can 
raise money for their own political campaigns in the form of 
campaign contributions from supporters pleased by their 
actions.100 They can stop, delay, harass, or hinder the 
implementation of federal policies that they ideologically oppose.  
It is therefore not surprising that one must look hard and 
long to find a lawsuit brought by the states challenging the 
federal government that is motivated by deep-founded concerns 
for separation of powers rather than by partisan preference. It 
is, after all, no accident that Republican attorneys general 
led the actions against the Obama Administration and that 
 
 96 Moreover, while the checks provided by the Constitution can be politically costly 
for Congress to use, the filing of a lawsuit is relatively low cost. Expanding congressional 
standing could very well result in members of Congress using only lawsuits, and not the 
constitutionally prescribed procedures, to challenge executive actions. 
 97  To be sure, not all suits by state attorneys general have partisan motivations. See 
Lemos & Young, supra note 79, at 25–26 (arguing that business interests and other 
considerations drive some state attorney general litigation decisions). 
 98 See generally Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 
127 HARV. L. REV. 853 (2014) (arguing there are both personal and departmental 
incentives for state attorneys general to score significant legal victories, including 
political and reputational benefits, pleasing state constituencies for reelection purposes, 
and obtaining financial awards that can often be retained by enforcement agencies). 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id.  
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Democratic attorneys general prosecuted lawsuits against 
President Trump.101 
It was not always this way. For many years, state attorneys 
general worked across party lines to protect state interests;102 
including, on occasion, taking actions contrary to their own 
partisan interests.103 No longer. Bipartisanship has become the 
rare exception104 and institutional concerns have become 
subservient to partisan agendas.105 The same polarization forces 
that once undermined Congress’s ability to check the president 
now affect state attorneys general.106 
This is not to say a suit filed for partisan reasons is somehow 
illegitimate or cannot have a substantial effect in checking 
against separation of powers abuses.107 It does suggest, however, 
the states may not have such a uniquely pristine role in 
patrolling federal executive action that they can be distinguished 
from other interested parties for the purpose of standing. It also 
suggests that even if states are granted standing, the credibility 
and gravitas of their claims may be diminished,108 thus 
undercutting one of the central reasons for granting states 
expansive standing in the first place.109 
Expanded state standing may also bring to the forefront 
another difficult issue—determining who, for the purposes of 
such litigation, is the appropriate officer or entity to represent 
the state. Is it the state attorney general, the governor, the 
 
 101 See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text (showing that Republican attorneys 
general and Republican states take action against Democratic presidents, while 
Democratic attorneys general and Democratic states take action against Republican 
presidents); see also Margaret H. Lemos & Kevin M. Quinn, Litigating State Interests: 
Attorneys General As Amici, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1251–52 (2015) (showing an overall 
increase in partisan amicus briefs filed by state attorneys general beginning in 
the 2000s). 
 102 Anthony Johnstone, Hearing the States, 45 PEPP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) 
(manuscript at 20). 
 103 Lemos & Quinn, supra note 101, at 1256. 
 104 See PAUL NOLETTE, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL: STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND 
NATIONAL POLICYMAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (2015); see Johnstone, supra note 
102, at 23 (suggesting the turning point of this may have been when then-Alabama 
Attorney General (now Judge William Pryor) created the Republican Attorneys General 
Association). 
 105 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1090–92 
(2014) (noting that state objections to federal power are primarily based on partisan 
politics and not the protection of state prerogatives). 
 106 Id. 
 107 See Lemos & Young, supra note 79, at 30 (arguing that state litigation with 
partisan motivation still plays the useful role of checking federal power); Grove, supra 
note 55, at 897 (rejecting the notion that states should have expansive standing to sue the 
federal government but also noting that partisan motivations can lead “state officials to 
do a better job of representing the State in court”). 
 108 Johnstone, supra note 102, at 22. 
 109 See supra notes 36–71 and accompanying text. 
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leaders of the legislature, or even citizens who sponsor state 
initiatives? Should state attorneys general have the authority to 
bring such lawsuits on behalf of the state when the legislature or 
the governor opposes such actions? Should the attorneys general 
be required to bring such a claim if the governor or legislature 
presses her to do so, even if she opposes such action? And how, if 
at all, should a federal court hearing such a claim resolve this 
internal issue? Put simply, there is a Pandora’s Box of state law 
issues underlying these lawsuits,110 and federal courts will have 
to insert themselves in the thicket of intra-state divisions of 
power to be able to hear these cases. It is a project, we suspect, 
federal courts might want to avoid.111 
Finally, expanded state standing to challenge federal 
executive action also means an expanded role for the courts. As 
discussed above, there are strong positive reasons why courts 
should be more involved in imposing constraints upon executive 
branch action, but also reasons to be cautious. After all, the 
theories that posit that disputes over federalism and separation 
of powers should be resolved by the political processes rather 
than the courts112 presented more than just an abstract 
 
 110 See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency?: Governors, State 
Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2455–67 
(2006) (discussing cases addressing which state officer represents the state); Joseph 
Kanefield & Blake W. Rebling, Who Speaks for Arizona: The Respective Roles of the 
Governor and Attorney General When the State is Named in a Lawsuit, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 
689 (2011) (discussing the various issues surrounding which state official should 
represent a state and concluding that, for the purpose of unity and clarity, the state 
attorney general should be subservient to the governor in any case involving the state); 
but see State ex rel. Discover Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Nibert, 744 S.E.2d 625, 642–45 (W. Va. 
2013) (ruling that state attorney generals have common law powers that are not specified 
by statute, despite the fact other courts and legal scholars disagree on this point); see also 
Press Release, Georgia: Governor Lifts Block Against Syrian Refugees (Jan. 4, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/05/us/georgia-governor-lifs-block-against-syrian-
refugees.html (describing when Georgia’s Governor Nathan Deal rescinded an executive 
order to block the placement of Syrian refugees within his state, after his attorney general 
officially announced that Governor Deal did not have the authority to issue such an order 
in the first place); Press Release, Office of Attorney General Mark Brnovich, Terry 
Goddard Declines to Join Lawsuits Against Federal Health Care Law (Mar. 24, 2010), 
https://groupwise.azag.gov/press-release/terry-goddard-declines-join-lawsuits-against-
federal-health-care-law [http://perma.cc/39PX-8U4J] (describing Democrat Attorney 
General Goddard’s refusal to join the Republican-led health care suit for its lack of merit); 
State ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., No. 3:10–cv–91–
RV/EMT, 2010 WL 2000518 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2010) (in which Republican Governor Jan 
Brewer represented Arizona in a suit when Arizona’s attorney general publicly refused 
to join). 
 111 Cf. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 30 (1959) (holding the 
federal court should abstain in answering the question of whether a city had the power to 
initiate eminent domain proceedings under state law). 
 112 See, e.g., JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 
263 (1980) (arguing the judiciary should not rule on constitutional questions regarding 
the allocation of powers between Congress and the president); Herbert Wechlsler, The 
Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1965) (arguing the Supreme Court 
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affirmation of the role of politics as a constitutional constraint on 
the exercise of federal power. They also offered the tangible 
advantage of extricating the judiciary from particularly difficult 
and often highly politicized determinations. Setting a standard 
for when separation of powers is violated consistently presents 
the judiciary with concerns of judicial management, as well as 
with questions of judicial enforceability and the challenge of 
maintaining political capital when issuing politically charged 
decisions. Accordingly, fashioning doctrines that could keep the 
courts out of federalism and inter-branch disputes was attractive 
on a number of counts. As Alexander Bickel taught long ago, 
there are significant benefits that may be gained from a 
modest judiciary.113 
The value of avoiding the courts as the arbiters of politically-
laden issues surrounding the scope of presidential power may 
have even greater resonance in the current climate in which the 
dynamics of polarization and judicial selection have infected the 
courts as well as the other branches.114 First, if the courts’ 
decisions regarding the exercise of presidential power are 
motivated by partisan concerns, they will hardly do much to 
constrain the Executive, particularly when the president is of the 
same party. Second, to the extent that court decisions seem to 
reflect partisan preferences, they will undercut the courts’ 
legitimacy.115 Third, even if the judicial system as a whole is able 
to insulate itself against partisan decision-making, particular 
judges may not be so self-constrained. Already, the experience 
with states bringing actions challenging federal action has 
reflected a substantial amount of judge shopping, and there is no 
reason to assume that savvy attorneys general will cease using 
this tactic in later cases. But the potential costs to the national 
interest of a partisan decision by an errant judge could be 
considerable. A single judge, after all, can do significant mischief 
in interrupting presidential actions—even if that action later 
turns out to be perfectly legal. 
 
must exercise restraint and neutrality, and that there must be limits on its ability to bind 
other branches and the states in its constitutional interpretation).  
 113 See generally ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962) (advocating that the Supreme Court use discretion 
to avoid deciding controversial issues); see also Flaherty, supra note 2, at 1828 
(advocating that courts revisit and incorporate Bickel’s notions of “passive virtues”). 
 114 See Johnstone, supra note 102, at 3–4. 
 115 Id. at 5. 
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IV. RELAXING INJURY IN FACT FOR STATES TO CHALLENGE 
EXECUTIVE ACTIONS 
What should be clear by this point is that states are 
particularly well positioned to constrain expanding executive 
power. States have a unique federalism interest in ensuring that 
federal executive officers comply with the Constitution and 
federal laws, and they have the resources and sophistication to 
bring successful suits of this sort. At the same time, however, 
there are concerns with granting states plenary standing to bring 
any suit against the Executive. One way to balance these benefits 
and concerns about empowering states to challenge executive 
actions is to relax the injury in fact test for states, but impose 
prudential constraints on standing. Easing the injury in fact test 
would expand the power of the state to bring suit. But it would 
still require states to demonstrate some type of actual injury that 
would ensure that states do not meddle in affairs that truly do 
not affect them. Moreover, continuing to enforce prudential 
limitations, such as third-party standing, would prevent states 
from bringing suits that others are better positioned to litigate. 
Finally, in order to further guard against hyper-partisanship, we 
also propose requiring states to show some level of bipartisan 
support to maintain their actions against the Executive. 
The injury in fact test requires that a plaintiff show he has 
suffered, or is imminently about to suffer, an “injury in fact.”116 
That injury must be to a “legally protected interest,” and it must 
be “concrete and particularized.”117 Moreover, the injury must be 
traceable to the defendant and of the sort that courts could likely 
redress through a ruling in favor of the plaintiff.118 Ordinarily, a 
plaintiff satisfies this test by showing a loss of money or physical 
harm.119 However, this is not always the case. Although courts 
purport to apply the same injury in fact test in all cases, in 
practice, different tests apply to different types of cases.120 
For example, courts have often relaxed the injury 
requirement for Equal Protection Clause violations.121 Thus, in 
 
 116 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492–93 (2009). 
 117 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). 
 118 Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61(1992). 
 119 But see Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) (defining injury in fact to 
include injuries to “[a]esthetic and environmental well-being” and “economic well-being”). 
 120 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061, 
1065 (2015). 
 121 Id. at 1075 (“[T]he Supreme Court does not always demand a redressable ‘Wallet 
Injury’ to ground standing . . . under the Equal Protection Clause.”); see also Bowen v. 
Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618–19 (1988) (the Court notoriously relaxed standing for alleged 
Establishment Clause violations); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure 
of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 328 (2002) (“[T]he Court often waves litigants 
complaining of government support for religious endeavor right past the injury hurdle.”). 
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Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Court held that a 
nonminority contractor had standing to challenge a government 
program that gave preference to minority businesses.122 In doing 
so, the Court dispensed with the “concrete” requirement for 
injury and the requirement of redressability because the plaintiff 
could not prove that it would have received any contracts if race 
were not considered.123 Instead, the Court explained the denial of 
the opportunity “to compete on an equal footing” constituted a 
sufficient injury for standing.124 
At the other end of the spectrum, courts have been less 
willing to find standing in cases in which the plaintiff challenges 
government actions related to national security.125 In Clapper v. 
Amnesty International USA, for example, the Court explicitly 
indicated the imminence requirement is particularly rigorous in 
suits challenging actions implicating national security.126 
Similarly, and more salient to this essay, federalism 
concerns appear to have led to restrictions on standing. Consider 
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons.127 There, an individual who had 
previously been choked by police sued the police, alleging he 
might again be subject to a police chokehold.128 The Court denied 
standing on the ground the injury was too speculative. Given 
the Court’s willingness to find standing based on other 
low-probability injuries, one explanation for the denial of 
standing in Lyons is the Court sought to avoid interfering with 
the inner workings of state’s government.129 
These decisions show that the rigor of the injury in fact test 
varies depending on certain considerations, such as separation of 
 
But see id. at 311 (discussing how the Court has not always been so generous with Equal 
Protection standing and listing cases as examples).  
 122 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 210–12 (1995). 
 123 See id. at 211. 
 124 Id. (“The injury in cases of this kind is that a ‘discriminatory classification 
prevent[s] the plaintiff from competing on an equal footing.’”) (quoting Ne. Fla. Chapter, 
Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 667 (1993)). For 
other examples of the same analysis, see Ne. Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of 
Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 667–68 (1993), and Regents of the Univ. of Cal. 
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 281 n.14 (1978). 
 125 F. Andrew Hessick, The Separation-of-Powers Theory of Standing, 95 N.C. L. REV. 
673, 725 (2017) (arguing the standing test is stricter for national security cases than 
Equal Protection Clause cases). 
 126 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013); see Fallon, supra note 
120, at 1079 (expanding on this point). 
 127 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
 128 Id. at 97–98. 
 129 F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 76 (2012) (“The 
denial of standing in Lyons and the grant of standing in Laidlaw may reflect the Court's 
unwillingness to interfere in the workings of state government.”). 
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powers, federalism, and the type of right asserted.130 When a suit 
raises a challenge in an area that federal courts generally seek to 
avoid, such as national security or the military, the standing 
inquiry is more stringent.131 By contrast, when a suit seeks to 
vindicate rights that federal courts have regarded as particularly 
important, the standing test is relaxed.132 
In this light, the injury in fact test should be relaxed when a 
state sues to force executive officers to comply with the law.133 As 
discussed above, states have a unique interest in preventing 
unlawful federal action. Permitting states to protect that interest 
is a fundamental component of the division of power in the 
Constitution. More pragmatically, state officials are prudent 
enough to bring only those suits that matter, that they may win, 
and that they have the resources to argue effectively. They 
accordingly should face a lower standing threshold when 
challenging unlawful executive action or inaction. 
There are a variety of ways to operationalize a relaxed 
standing requirement. One way is to expand the types of injuries 
that suffice for state standing in such suits. For example, one 
could expand state standing to injuries for which the states are 
partly responsible. Courts have said individuals should not be 
permitted to base standing on injuries that are based on 
reactions to federal actions. Thus, in Clapper, the Court held that 
the costs that private individuals incurred to avoid federal 
surveillance was insufficient to confer standing on those 
individuals to challenge the surveillance program.134 But one 
could discard this restriction when states sue the Executive. 
The Fifth Circuit arguably adopted this approach in Texas v. 
United States.135 There, the Republican Attorney General of 
Texas challenged President Obama’s policies deeming various 
types of illegal immigrants to be lawfully present in the United 
 
 130 Id. at 77 (noting that separation of powers, federalism, and docket size affect 
standing decisions). 
 131 See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 68, 73 (1984) (“In 
fact the law of standing has become so disjointed that the danger now exists that the 
Court will come to accept it as a manipulable doctrine whose primary value lies in its 
ability to serve nonjurisdictional ends.”). 
 132 See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL 
L. REV. 275, 304 (2008) (“The Court has been hesitant to deny standing in cases involving 
the violation of a right that the Court deems particularly important even when the 
plaintiff has not suffered a perceptible injury.”). 
 133 See Indiana v. EPA, 796 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir. 2015) (suggesting that even 
though a state cannot sue the United States parens patriae, it should get “‘special 
solicitude’ to sue the United States . . . if a quasi-sovereign interest of the state is 
at stake”). 
 134 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 417 (2013). 
 135 See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 155–56 (5th Cir. 2015), aff'd by an 
equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
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States. To establish standing, Texas argued that under Texas 
law, these immigrants could obtain driver’s licenses, and Texas 
would incur costs in issuing these licenses. The Fifth Circuit held 
these costs supported Texas’s standing, even though Texas could 
have eliminated those costs by amending Texas law to bar those 
immigrants from obtaining licenses.136 
This is not to say states should always be able to create an 
injury in fact. For example, Texas should not have had standing 
if it enacted its law authorizing immigrants to obtain driver’s 
licenses after President Obama adopted his policies. In that 
situation, federal law would not have forced Texas to incur the 
costs of providing licenses to immigrants because, at that time of 
the adoption of the federal policy, Texas would not have been 
required to provide licenses to immigrants. Rather, Texas would 
have incurred the cost of providing licenses to immigrants 
through its own action of enacting the Texas law against the 
backdrop of the federal policy.  
Nor is it fair to say that any federal action that conflicts with 
state law creates an injury in fact sufficient for the state’s 
standing.137 The state must point to some sort of factual effect on 
the state to establish an injury in fact.  
Another way to soften the injury in fact test for state claims 
against the executive is to relax the requirement that the injury 
not be speculative,138 requiring states to show only that there is a 
realistic possibility that they might suffer the threatened harm 
instead of a high probability. This approach finds support in the 
decision of the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA.139 There, 
Massachusetts sued the EPA for failing to regulate carbon 
dioxide. Massachusetts claimed it had standing because federal 
law conferred a cause of action on the states to challenge the 
EPA’s decision, and because the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s failure to regulate carbon dioxide would result in global 
warming, which in turn would raise sea levels and erode 
 
 136 See id. at 155–57. 
 137 See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 268 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(concluding the preemption of Virginia law prohibiting individual mandates by the 
individual mandate provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act did not 
cause Virginia an injury in fact). It may be possible that federal preemption of state law 
creates standing based on the impairment of the state’s sovereign interest, as opposed to 
being based on the state suffering an injury in fact. But we leave that issue for 
another day. 
 138 Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); see also Diamond v. 
Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 66 (1986) (rejecting standing based on “unadorned speculation”); 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975) (denying standing because the plaintiffs had not 
demonstrated a “substantial probability” of harm). 
 139 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007). 
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Massachusetts’s land.140 The Court concluded these 
considerations sufficed for standing, explaining when they have 
“quasi-sovereign interests” at stake, states are entitled to “special 
solicitude” in the standing analysis.141 The Court did not explain 
what it meant by “special solicitude.” One might think from the 
reference to “quasi-sovereign interests” that the special solicitude 
referred to parens patriae standing. But that is not so. The Court 
did not base standing on Massachusetts’s role as parens patriae. 
Instead, the Court pointed to the factual injury of the erosion to 
Massachusetts’s land.142 
Rather than referring to parens patriae standing, it appears 
that the special solicitude the Court afforded Massachusetts was 
to relax the restriction on speculative injuries. The erosion to 
Massachusetts’s land would not occur for decades.143 That distant 
and speculative injury would likely not suffice for standing.144 
The Court’s conclusion that the possible erosion did suffice 
suggests that it applied the imminence requirement less 
rigorously. Massachusetts v. EPA thus supports the idea that, 
when a state alleges a quasi-sovereign interest, the standing 
inquiry should be relaxed, even when the state seeks to 
base standing on an injury in fact instead of parens 
patriae standing.145 
At the same time, we also suggest that even this relatively 
modest proposal of relaxing the injury in fact requirement 
for states should be further qualified. As pointed out 
previously, expanded state standing creates its own set of 
concerns—specifically that many of these actions will be 
driven more by a motivation for political disruption than by a 
true concern with executive branch overreach.146 Some, of course, 
might suggest this is fine—that the use of highly partisan 
attorneys general as a check against highly partisan presidents 
is fully consonant with Madison’s notion of ambition 
counteracting ambition.147 Perhaps. Yet the use of excessive 
 
 140 Id. at 518–22. 
 141 Id. at 520. 
 142  Id. at 521–24. 
 143 Id. at 541–42 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting the possible loss of land as one 
harm supporting standing in the next few decades). 
 144 As the Court explained in Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565 n.2 (1992), 
the further off in time that an injury may occur tends to make the injury more 
speculative. See id. (stating the “purpose” of “imminence” is “to ensure that the alleged 
injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is ‘certainly 
impending’”) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)). 
 145  For other instances in which federal courts have relaxed standing requirements 
for states, see Lemos & Young, supra note 79, at 11–12. 
 146 See supra notes 36–71 and accompanying text.  
 147 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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partisanship as a method to reduce the effects of excessive 
partisanship does not seem to be the type of remedy that would 
help combat the polarization that lies at the heart of much of the 
dysfunction that has helped lead to the expansion of presidential 
power in the first place. More directly, the potential risk to the 
national interest engendered by overly partisan attorneys 
general bringing harassment or dilatory actions against the 
executive in front of overly partisan courts is not one that can be 
easily glossed over. 
For this reason, we propose the courts demand some indicia 
of bipartisanship as a prudential matter before relaxing the 
injury in fact requirement for states.148 To be clear, we are not 
suggesting that courts should deny standing if the state meets 
traditional injury in fact requirements.149 But in cases in which 
the injury in fact requirement needs to be relaxed to find 
standing, there should be a showing that the action has some 
measure of bipartisan support to justify the “special solicitude” 
the Supreme Court had indicated may be warranted when a 
sovereign state is bringing the claim.150 Thus, under our 
approach, both the state plaintiffs in Massachusetts v. EPA151 
and in United States v. Texas152 would have had to demonstrate 
bipartisan support, since in both cases the injury in fact 
requirement was relaxed.153 In Washington v. Trump,154 on the 
other hand, no showing would have been needed because the 
state readily satisfied injury in fact requirements.155 
Anthony Johnstone and Michael Solimine, writing 
separately, have advocated for a similar approach in the context 
of amicus briefs, contending that the Supreme Court should only 
give deference to briefs from the states that reflect some level of 
bipartisan support.156 In fact, the National Association of 
Attorneys General (“NAAG”) already requires bipartisan action 
by attorneys general in order to invoke the authority of the 
states. Its constitution requires that in order for a sign-on letter 
 
 148 This does not necessarily mean more than one state will always be necessary to 
maintain an action. But if one state goes at it alone, it should be required to assert that 
the action has some bipartisan support. 
 149 E.g., Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d. 1151, 1159 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 150 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007); Indiana v. EPA, 796 F.3d 803, 
810 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 151 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518. 
 152 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 155–56 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 153 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518; Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d at 
155–56. 
 154 Trump, 847 F.3d at 1158–61. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Johnstone, supra note 102, note at 29–30; Michael Solimine, Retooling the Amicus 
Machine, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 151, 166 n.86 (2016). 
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to become NAAG policy (appearing on NAAG letterhead as a 
result), the letter must have at least the support of thirty-six 
attorneys general (a two-thirds majority of NAAG’s overall state 
and territorial membership).157 
These approaches make sense. As Johnstone indicates, the 
requirement of bipartisanship works to assure that the case is “a 
reliable signal of general state interests.”158 Further, because 
such a requirement would force attorneys general to work across 
party lines, it may, in that respect, have the additional benefit of 
helping work against the tide of partisan polarization.159 
We also propose the courts should not allow states to 
maintain third-party standing cases absent a showing of cross 
party support. The Court has already held that whether a party 
can sue on behalf of the rights of third parties is a matter for 
prudential consideration.160 Taking steps to assure that a lawsuit 
against the president brought by a state is more than only 
a partisan attack would seem to be a prudent exercise of 
judicial power.161 
Finally, state standing should be allowed only upon a proper 
showing that the state officer or entity bringing the suit is the 
single correct party to maintain the action in the federal court. 
As noted previously, various state officials—the governor, 
attorney general, legislators, and even individuals who sponsor 
state initiatives—often dispute who has the authority to litigate 
on behalf of the state.162 Those disputes are exacerbated when 
the officers disagree on the merits of the action. Both the state 
attorney general who thinks the president has violated the 
Constitution and the state governor who thinks that the 
president’s action is lawful may each claim that he alone has the 
power to bring suit on behalf of the state. To avoid the 
embarrassment of resolving a suit against the president 
improperly brought by the wrong state official, federal courts 
should closely examine whether the official bringing the case has 
the authority to do so under state law. If state law does not 
authorize the officer who brought the suit to do so, or even if the 
law is unclear, courts exercise their discretion to deny standing. 
Dismissing on that ground would prevent unnecessary conflict 
 
 157 CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS 
GENERAL art. VIII, § 2. 
 158 Johnstone, supra note 102, at 29. 
 159 See id.; Michael E. Solimine, State Amici, Collective Action, and the Development 
of Federalism Doctrine, 46 GA. L. REV. 355, 393 (2012). 
 160 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975). 
 161 Cf. Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2004). 
 162 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
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with the president and avoid deciding many unnecessary 
constitutional questions.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The vast expansion of presidential power in the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries, as well as the possibility of a runaway 
presidency, calls for new ways for thinking about how to 
constrain the Executive. Granting the states standing to 
challenge federal executive action is one avenue deserving 
exploration. Expansive state standing, however, raises its 
own set of concerns—including further exacerbating the 
over-politicization issues that are currently plaguing both the 
state offices of the attorneys general and the federal courts. 
There is thus a legitimate question as to whether liberalized 
state standing may raise more problems than it solves. 
In this essay, we offer a modest solution. We propose the 
states should not have standing to raise purely abstract issues 
but that a more generous notion of injury in fact should be 
applied to them than to other entities. Such an approach allows 
states to maintain actions against the Executive that might 
otherwise not be justiciable. We further suggest, however, even 
this limited grant of standing should be subject to prudential 
review because of the potential problems that expanded state 
standing generates.  
We end with a final word of caution from the opinion by 
Justice Jackson in Youngstown that is cited at the beginning of 
this essay. Although the Court in Youngstown found the 
president’s action in that case to be unconstitutional, Justice 
Jackson’s opinion in that case was not optimistic that the 
decision would effectively constrain the Executive. As he wrote:  
But I have no illusion that any decision by this Court can keep power 
in the hands of Congress if it is not wise and timely in meeting its 
problems. A crisis that challenges the President equally, or perhaps 
primarily, challenges Congress. If not good law, there was worldly 
wisdom in the maxim attributed to Napoleon that “The tools belong to 
the man who can use them.” We may say that power to legislate for 
emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only Congress itself 
can prevent power from slipping through its fingers.163 
Expanded state standing to challenge federal executive 
action, in short, may be warranted; but it, by itself, will not be 
sufficient to seriously constrain presidential power. The broader 
solutions lie elsewhere. 
 
 163 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952). 
 
